Animals and plants defend themselves against a variable community of biological enemies. We argue that the effectiveness of allocation to defence (the success of defence per unit allocation) may be expected to decrease as the diversity of attack types increases, and asked how the optimal allocation to defence covaries with the effectiveness of defence. Variation in effectiveness links optimal defence to coevolutionary processes; the prime characteristic of coevolutionary interactions is that they promote and maintain genetic variation in both hosts and their enemies, leading to variation in the effectiveness of defence. We present a simple model suggesting that as effectiveness decreases, the fitness benefit of defence disappears. In other words, when effectiveness is low, the optimal strategy is to tolerate damage. As effectiveness increases, the optimal allocation flips rapidly from no-defence (tolerance) to high allocation to defence, and then decreases at a decelerating pace as effectiveness increases. We conclude that diversifying coevolution, as it covaries with the effectiveness of defence, constrains the evolution of optimal defence strategies and may be a very important component in determining the optimal allocation to defence and variation in the success of defence as it is seen in the wild.
Selection by biological enemies (parasites, predators, pathogens and herbivores) has led to the evolution of a variety of defences, including a complex immune system, morphological defences, defensive chemical compounds, and behaviours that serve to avoid or fight off enemies. But although enemies are common and abundant, a universally perfect defence has not evolved. Two lines of non-exclusive theories help to understand what maintains variation in the success of defence. First, it is expected that defence carries costs when it is not needed, lowering the fitness of defended individuals in the absence of enemies (Rhoades 1979 , Simms and Rausher 1987 , Clark and Harvell 1992 , Sheldon and Verhulst 1996 . Hence, in a Panglossian world with optimal solutions, the benefits of allocating resources to defence should be weighed against the costs of defence to achieve the optimal allocation strategy for limited resources (McKey 1979, Simms and Rausher In this paper, we combine the two views (optimal allocation and the diversity of attack types) to explore the factors that affect the optimal allocation to defence, and what level of defence should be expected in relation to variety of challenges. We are especially interested in how the optimal allocation to defence changes when the organism is challenged by a low or high diversity of enemies. We use the coevolution argument to illustrate that the diversity of challenges primarily sets an external limit on the evolution of optimal allocation to defence in a given host.
Two well-studied parameters that affect optimal defence are the expected probability of attack (or the risk of infection/disease/herbivory) (McKey 1979 , Rhoades 1979 , A , strö m and Lundberg 1994 , Zangerl and Rutledge 1996 , van Baalen 1998 , and the potential magnitude of damage after a successful attack (virulence) (Frank 1991 , Antia et al. 1994 , Ewald 1995 , van Baalen 1998 . A third important, but less studied, factor is the effectiveness of defence. The effectiveness of allocation to defence has an intimate link to coevolutionary processes. We define the effectiveness of allocation to defence as the success of defence per unit of allocation (Simms and Rausher 1987 , A , strö m and Lundberg 1994 , Taylor et al. 1998 , and argue that it is important for the following reasons. In natural populations, the average (expected) effectiveness of defence depends on the variety of challenges that the host faces. For example, the same means of defence that is effective against one enemy does not necessarily suffice to protect from another type of enemy (Haukioja and Niemelä 1979 , Carroll and Hoffman 1980 , Fox 1981 , 1988 , Black 1993 , Adler and Karban 1994 , Hwang and Lindroth 1997 , Taylor et al. 1998 . Because hosts usually cannot accurately predict which enemies they will encounter during their life span, it is the expected effectiveness against the prevailing diversity of challenges that determines the optimal allocation to defence. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the effectiveness of defence per unit allocation decreases as the diversity of challenges increases. To achieve the same level of protection, maintaining several different means of defence is likely to require a higher allocation to defence than maintaining one specific type of defence (Fowler and Rausher 1985 , Strauss 1991 , Taylor et al. 1998 . Note that variation in the diversity of risk is not the same as variation in the probability of attack. A single, abundant enemy may attack the host with the same frequency as several less abundant enemies but the diversity of challenge is not the same.
Although the Red Queen process is usually depicted as a one-host against a one-parasite race (Jaenike 1978 , Hamilton 1980 , Lively 1987 , Lively et al. 1990 , the restriction to a single, variable parasite species is not necessary for our purposes. In fact, typically a whole community of different enemies simultaneously or sequentially attack the host individual. We acknowledge that the diversity of challenge is composed of withinspecies (strains of single enemy species) and among-species diversity (community structure of enemies). However, under the Red Queen scenario, different parasites coevolve with the common host more or less independently of each other; therefore, the diversity of challenges that a host faces is not expected to diminish with time. In fact, the prime characteristic of Red Queen-type coevolution is that it promotes and maintains genetic diversity both in hosts and their enemies (Bremerman 1980) . Rather than modelling the temporal dynamics of this process in full, we assume that coevolution leads to an ''externally determined'' level of challenge diversity which may or may not vary with ecological factors. It is the variation in this external constraint (level of challenge diversity) that we associate with the effectiveness of defence. Therefore, at any frozen moment of time, the effectiveness of defence is linked to the state of the coevolutionary scenario, that is prone to vary with respect to ecological and historical factors (Thompson 1997) .
Because our aim is to illustrate general principles, we use a simple model to ask how the optimal allocation to defence responds to variation in the effectiveness of defence, and how virulence (damage due to successful attack), or unit costs of allocation to defence (availability of resources) modifies this relationship. Our results suggest a general trend: the optimal allocation to defence should increase as effectiveness decreases, suggesting that when the diversity of challenge increases, so does the optimal level of defence. However, as the fitness benefit of defence decreases with effectiveness, allocation to defence will eventually have no benefit. At this point, the optimal allocation to defence collapses from high to none, and the acceptance of damage (''tolerance'') may become the optimal strategy.
The model
Assume that an organism allocates some, z, of its available resources to defence (0 BzB). In the absence of attacks allocation to defence is expected to lead to fitness costs in terms of survival and reproduction. Hence, we let fitness, w(z), decrease as a function of allocation to defence:
We chose to use this technically convenient function to develop the model; other functions with similar properties of monotonic decrease in fitness would qualitatively lead to the same conclusions. Here, b is a shape parameter that describes how costly the defence is for every resource unit that has been allocated (b= ''unit cost of defence'', Fig. 1 ). Alternatively, b can also be interpreted as an index of resource availability, or costs of reproduction in a given environment (Fig. 1A) .
At the same time, defence is assumed to be reliable only in relation to the allocation, z, such that a higher allocation leads to a higher probability of success when attacked:
Here, a is a shape parameter that describes how reliable defence is per unit of resource allocated to defence. We call a the effectiveness of allocation to defence (Fig.  1B) . Small values of a would result, for example, from exposure to a wide variety of parasites such that any given defence tactic is unlikely to succeed, making the return in reliability per unit allocated small. Note that the relative values of a and b determine the return for resources invested in defence and in other components of fitness, respectively. Unattacked individuals carry the fitness cost of defence and hence achieve fitness w(z). Middle: Attacked individuals eliminate the infection with reliability f(z) and then achieve the same fitness as unattacked individuals. Right: Infected individuals that fail to defend [with probability 1−f(z)] suffer a fitness cost due to defence investment and an additional loss of d, the cost of being infected. Fig. 1 . A. We expect the allocation of resources to defence (z) to include costs as it decreases the availability of resources to other fitness correlated traits (eq. 1). Lines show the shape of this function at different values of parameter b (eq. 1). b describes the unit costs of defence; i.e., how much each allocation unit costs when scaled to fitness. B. We expect the allocation to defence (z) to increase the probability of successful defence when attacked (eq. 2). This relationship may be modified by the effectiveness of defence (a). If effectiveness is high, the probability of success per unit allocation to defence increases more than when effectiveness is low. It is plausible to assume that effectiveness of defence is related to diversity of attacks; if attack diversity is high, effectiveness may be expected to be lower than when attack diversity is low.
Assume furthermore that p is the probability of attack by the average parasite in a given environment, or the force of infection in epidemiological terms. If an individual is attacked, but can successfully defend itself, we assume that its fitness will be the same as for a non-attacked individual. Assuming the same fitness for attacked and non-attacked individuals simplifies the model, and is typical for models of constitutive defence. If defence fails, an individual pays an additional fitness cost, d. Note that d is the magnitude of damage resulting from a successful attack, or virulence of a parasite. In addition, d represents the average level of damage expected from the diversity of enemies in the host's habitat.
Following Fig. 2 , the expected fitness, as a function of z, can be calculated as:
To find the level of allocation to defence, z= z*, that maximizes fitness W, we set (W(z)/(z=0. Then, the optimal allocation to defence is found at:
The second derivative at this point,
OIKOS 89:2 (2000) is always negative for positive parameter values, indicating that at the point z*, fitness is at a local maximum. We report three types of results based on the model. First, we show how optimal allocation to defence, z*, varies with respect to effectiveness of defence (a). Second, we calculate the fitness benefit of defence at optimal allocation, and show how this is related to effectiveness (a). We define fitness benefit as the fitness difference between optimally defending individuals (z= z*), and individuals that do not allocate resources to defence (z =0). Thus, setting z =z* (eq. 3) gives:
and when z=0 (eq. 3):
Therefore, the fitness benefit of optimal defence is
Third, we calculate the probability of successful defence. This indicates how large a risk of failure the optimal strategy includes. According to Fig. 2 , the probability of successful defence is:
Model predictions
We examine the results of the model graphically by varying the relevant parameters with respect to effectiveness of defence (a). Note that the expected virulence (d) and probability of attack (p) are interchangeable parameters in the model (as they enter as one product in eqs 4 and 8), and may therefore be replaced by one another in the figures. We first examine how the optimal allocation to defence (z*) varies with respect to the effectiveness of defence, and then how variation in the unit cost of defence (resource availability) modifies the optimal allocation at different levels of effectiveness. Graphical analysis shows that at low levels of virulence any allocation to defence does not pay, especially if the effectiveness of defence is low (Fig. 3A, B) . In this area of parameter space, tolerance of damage is the optimal strategy (z* =0). Not surprisingly, when the expected virulence, or probability of attack is high, some allocation to defence is almost always expected, independent of effectiveness (Fig. 3A) . As virulence increases, the optimal allocation to defence increases as well, and the area where tolerance is the optimal strategy decreases (Fig. 3A, B) .
As may be anticipated, the highest optimal allocation to defence is found when the effectiveness of defence is low and the probability of a highly virulent attack is high (Fig. 3A) . Perhaps the most striking result of the model is that as effectiveness increases from low to high, there seems to be a sharp transition zone, where the optimal allocation to defence flips from ''no defence'' to a high allocation to defence (Fig. 3A, B) . As effectiveness increases further, the optimal allocation to defence again decreases, corroborating the prediction that low effectiveness (or high diversity of challenge) may require a generally higher allocation to defence. The fitness benefit of the optimal allocation to defence increases with effectiveness (Fig. 3C, D) , but improving effectiveness indefinitely yields diminishing returns (Fig.  3C, D) . Therefore, low effectiveness, correlating with an increased diversity of challenges, can select for increased investment in defence -but only up to a point after which tolerance (no allocation to defence) may become the superior strategy. At this point the fitness difference between defending and non-defending individuals has decreased to zero (Fig. 3C, D) .
Why does the benefit of improved effectiveness level off? This is easily understood when we look at the variation in the probability of successful defence when allocation to defence is optimal (as expressed in eq. 9). Graphical analysis indicates that as effectiveness increases, the probability of successful defence increases rapidly at the transition zone, where the optimal allocation switches from ''no defence'' to ''high defence'' (Fig. 3E) . Additional improvement in effectiveness shows diminishing returns. Interestingly, the optimal allocation to defence always includes a risk of damage; i.e., defence is not expected to be perfect.
These results were obtained when the unit cost of allocation to defence (b), or resource availability, was kept constant. Now, we relax this assumption and look at how variation in unit cost of defence (resource availability) modifies the above result by varying the parameter b in our model. The probability of attack is instead kept constant (p=1), and the results are presented at two levels of virulence (d=0.4 and d=0.8). Graphical analysis indicates that when defence becomes more expensive (i.e., resource availability decreases), the optimal allocation to defence decreases at a decelerating pace (Fig. 4A, B) . The same pattern is found for any level of virulence. Variation in unit costs of defence modifies the area of parameter space where tolerance is the optimal strategy (Fig. 4A, B) . If defence has a high unit cost (e.g., when resources are scarce), tolerance is the optimal strategy in a larger area of the parameter space (Fig. 4A, B) . Interestingly, both the fitness benefit of allocation to defence and the probability of successful defence decrease as the unit cost of defence increases (Fig. 4C-F) , suggesting that ''risk-taking'' increases as a function of the unit cost of defence.
Discussion
Our findings indicate that effectiveness of defence may be an important, but until now inadequately examined predictor of the optimal allocation to defence. As we see the problem, effectiveness is closely linked to the diversity of attack types, which in turn results from the ongoing coevolution between hosts and enemies. In particular, we imply that a high diversity of attack types inherently reduces the effectiveness of defence and, therefore, is critically important in determining the optimal allocation to defence (Fig. 3A, B) . It is indeed common to find substantial variation among host populations in the diversity of natural enemies, and it may be expected that the effectiveness of defence varies at the same scale.
In our model, we found that, as effectiveness increases, the optimal allocation to defence flips from tolerating damage, to a high allocation to defence, but then decreases gradually as effectiveness further increases. Taken the assumption that effectiveness varies along a gradient from high to low diversity of challenge, the result suggests that host individuals faced with a high diversity of enemies should invest more in defence than individuals in environments where diversity of enemies is low. Furthermore, tolerance of damage may be expected under a more restricted set of conditions, for example, when effectiveness of defence is very low (high diversity of attacks), or the expected damage is minor (low virulence). Recall that this also implies that defence against parasites and pathogens that are genetically variable requires higher investment from the host than against genetically uniform enemies (several strains vs few strains).
It is plausible to assume that effectiveness of defence is a decreasing function of attack diversity, but empirical evidence testing this assumption is scarce. Taylor et al. (1998) tested this idea experimentally by subjecting hosts to either mixed-clone or single-clone malarial infections. Their results showed that hosts with mixedclone infections suffered higher levels of anaemia than hosts infected with only a single clone. Mixed-clone Fig. 3 . A, B. The optimal allocation to defence (z*, eq. 4) as a function of effectiveness of defence (a) and virulence (d) for two attack probabilities (p). Lines indicate the optimal defence at different levels of virulence (from 0.2 to 1.0, as indicated in the graph). C, D. Corresponding variation in the fitness benefit of defence. DW indicates the fitness difference between optimally defending individuals (z =z*) and individuals that allocate no resources to defence (z = 0, eq. 8). E. Probability of successful defence. Resource availability, b is set to 0.01 for all panels. Fig. 4. A, B . The optimal allocation to defence (z*, eq. 4) as a function of effectiveness of defence (a) and the unit costs of defence (b) for two attack scenarios. Lines indicate the optimal defence at different costs of defence (from 0.01 to 0.05, as indicated in the graph). C, D. Corresponding variation in the fitness benefit of defence. DW indicates the fitness difference between optimally defending individuals (z =z*) and individuals that allocate no resources to defence (z =0, eq. 8). E, F. Probability of successful defence (eq. 9).
infections inflicted higher costs to the host even though the total amount of parasite reproduction was similar between the two types of infections. Hence, the result suggests that a higher relative allocation to immune function was needed to fight the mixed parasites in order to limit energy loss to the same level as with the single clone infection treatment. The results of our study indicate that in a large area of parameter space, a decreased effectiveness of the immune system is expected to lead to higher optimal investment in defence, as Taylor et al. (1998) observed.
In a narrower area of parameter space, the optimal allocation to defence may actually decrease when the effectiveness of defence decreases, resulting in tolerance of damage being the optimal strategy. Not surprisingly, this strategy is unlikely to evolve when some of the enemies have a potentially high virulence (e.g. malaria as in Taylor et al. 1998) , or when the probability of attack is high (Fig. 3A, B) . However, when potential virulence is low and the probability of attack is moderate, tolerance may indeed be the optimal strategy. This may be the case, for example, in some plant-herbivore systems. The evolution of tolerance is widely discussed in the plant-herbivore literature (see review by Rosenthal and Kotanen 1994) , where the focus has been on the possible genetic trade-offs between tolerance and resistance, which are considered as alternative defence strategies (Simms and Triplett 1994 , Fineblum and Rausher 1995 , Mauricio et al. 1997 . Our results add a new point to this discussion by showing that tolerance may be the best strategy under certain conditions, and allocation to defence (resistance) beneficial when the conditions change. More specifically, for a given level of expected damage, tolerance of herbivory should be more common in cases where damage is caused by a diverse community of different herbivores rather than by a few species. This prediction could be tested with comparative studies among populations or host species.
One prediction of our model is that an increase in the unit cost of defence decrease the expected level of investment in defence. This prediction hardly comes as a surprise and seems to be supported by the results of several empirical studies (Norris et al. 1994 , Kö nig and Schmid-Hempel 1995 , Saino et al. 1998 , SchmidHempel and Schmid-Hempel 1998 . Interestingly, as the unit costs of defence increase, the optimal strategy includes a higher risk of unsuccessful defence (Fig. 4E,  F) . Therefore, one may expect that at the optimal allocation to defence, the frequency of successful attacks (the prevalence of disease/infection/herbivory) in-creases as resource availability decreases. This emphasizes two points. First, the frequency of successful attacks is not a good measure of the frequency of attacks, because success is modified by host investment in defence (Adler and Karban 1994) . Second, optimal defence allows failure; high unit costs of defence lead to an increase in the accepted risks.
The simple model presented here obviously leaves out many details of host-enemy relationships. Therefore, we cannot claim universal applicability. However, we propose this scenario in an attempt to merge the two separate aspects of defence theory which so far seem relatively unconnected in the literature -optimal allocation to defence against single enemies, as is typical for optimality analyses, and the diversifying effects of ongoing coevolution based on genotype-genotype interactions that leads to the maintenance of variability in both hosts and enemies. It is the latter aspect that considerably constrains the evolution of the former. It seems timely that more attention is paid to unify defence theory.
